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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 11-3732 
_____________ 
 
FITZROY GERALD GREEN, 
                                      Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                          Respondent 
______________ 
 
ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF  
THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS 
(Agency No. A099-232-461) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Margaret R. Reichenberg                     
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 10, 2012 
____________ 
 
Before: RENDELL, SMITH and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: July 13, 2012 ) 
____________ 
 
Elissa C. Steglich, Esq. 
Amelia Wilson, Esq. 
American Friends Service Committee 
Immigrant Rights Program 
89 Market Street 
6th Floor 
Newark, NJ 07102-0000 
 
Counsel for Petitioner 
 2 
 
 
Jason Wisecup, Esq. 
United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division 
P.O. Box 878 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC 20044 
 
Counsel for Respondent 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 
 Fitzroy Green (“Green”) petitions for review of the 
BIA‟s denial of his application for deferred removal under the 
United Nations Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  For 
the following reasons, the petition will be denied.   
 
I.  Background 
A.  Removability Determination 
 Green, a native and citizen of Jamaica, entered the 
United States on a tourist visa in 2002.  On September 16, 
2006, his immigration status was adjusted to that of a lawful 
permanent resident.  Less than a month later, on October 13, 
2006, he was arrested on charges of possession of a controlled 
dangerous substance with intent to distribute.  He pled guilty 
in New Jersey state court and was sentenced to one year of 
probation.  In 2008, Green was arrested again on charges of 
possession and distribution of a controlled dangerous 
substance.  He again pled guilty, and was sentenced to six 
months‟ imprisonment and two years‟ probation.  On May 28, 
2010, the Department of Homeland Security charged him 
with being removable from the United States under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), as an alien who had been convicted of a 
controlled substance offense.  Green admitted his prior 
 3 
convictions and raised no cognizable challenge to his 
removability, and the IJ found him removable as charged.   
 
B.  CAT Application 
 Following the IJ‟s determination that he was 
removable, Green filed an application for deferred removal 
under CAT.  In a subsequent hearing on his application, 
Green testified that he feared that he would be tortured by the 
Shower Posse, a powerful Jamaican drug gang formerly 
headed by Christopher “Dudus” Coke, if he were deported to 
Jamaica.  He explained that sometime in 1998 or 1999, while 
visiting his godmother at a Kingston-area hospital, he 
witnessed a group of gunmen burst into a nearby hospital 
room and shoot a suspected police informant and the police 
officer who had been assigned to guard him, killing both men.  
Green recognized three of the assailants as members of the 
Shower Posse, and despite initially refusing to discuss the 
killings with police, he eventually gave a statement in which 
he identified the shooters.  One of the shooters was 
subsequently arrested and convicted of murder, although 
Green was not asked to testify at the trial.  According to 
Green, Jamaican police also arrested at least one, and maybe 
both, of the other shooters.   
 
Green testified that as a result of his cooperation in this 
investigation, he and his family became targets of the Shower 
Posse.  His sister, Winsome, was killed in 2001 or 2002, and 
his brother, Cleon,
1
 was killed in 2009.  Green testified to his 
belief that both slayings were acts of retribution carried out 
by members of the Shower Posse.  Additionally, in 2002, 
Green himself was attacked in downtown Kingston by four 
men wielding knives and machetes, men he believes were 
Shower Posse gang members.  Green sustained multiple stab 
wounds and spent the night in a hospital, but he did not report 
the attack to police.  Several months after this attack, in July 
of 2002, Green left Jamaica for the United States and has not 
                                                 
1
 Although Green‟s brother is referred to as “Clan” at various 
points in the Administrative Record, we refer to him as 
“Cleon,” as that is the spelling Green provided during his 
sworn testimony before the IJ.  (A.R. at 107.) 
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returned since.   
 
C.  IJ and BIA Decisions 
 Although the IJ found Green‟s testimony to be 
credible, she ultimately denied his application for deferred 
removal under CAT.  She reasoned that even assuming 
arguendo that the Shower Posse still sought revenge against 
Green for his cooperation with authorities thirteen years ago, 
he had “failed to meet his burden to establish that the Shower 
Posse would be acting on behalf of the government of 
Jamaica or that the government of Jamaica would acquiesce 
in the actions of the Shower Posse,” as required under CAT.  
(A.R. at 40.)  Green appealed this decision to the BIA, which 
affirmed the IJ‟s ruling on the same ground, stating that 
Green “ha[d] not met his burden to establish that the 
government would turn a blind eye to the actions of the 
Shower Posse.”  (Id. at 3.)  On October 4, 2011, Green timely 
petitioned for review.   
 
II.  Jurisdiction & Standard of Review 
 Generally, we have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(1) to review a final order of the BIA denying relief 
under CAT.  However, in cases involving certain categories 
of criminal aliens—including aliens, like Green, who are 
removable due to controlled substance offenses under 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)—the statute provides that “no court 
shall have jurisdiction to review any final order of removal.”  
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).  Although it goes on to state that 
we may review “constitutional claims or questions of law,” 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), we lack jurisdiction to review factual 
findings underlying a removal order against an alien who has 
committed a controlled substance offense.   
 
When the BIA issues its own opinion, we generally 
review that decision as the final agency decision.  Sarango v. 
Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 651 F.3d 380, 383 (3d Cir. 2011).  
Here, however, the BIA‟s opinion “invokes specific aspects 
of the IJ‟s analysis and fact-finding in support of [its] 
conclusions,” and so we are obliged to review both the 
decisions of the IJ and the BIA.  Voci v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 
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607, 613 (3d Cir. 2005).  We review conclusions of law de 
novo, but give Chevron deference to the BIA‟s interpretation 
of the Immigration and Nationality Act.  Sarango, 651 F.3d at 
383.   
 
III.  Discussion 
 Green raises three arguments in his petition.  First, he 
challenges the IJ‟s factual determination that potential 
retribution carried out by the Shower Posse would not be 
attributable to the Jamaican government.  Second, he asserts 
that neither the BIA nor the IJ “complete[d] the two-pronged 
analysis as mandated by this Court” in Kaplun v. Attorney 
General of the United States, 602 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2010).  
(Pet‟r‟s Br. 8.)  And third, he claims that “neither the BIA nor 
the IJ considered the totality of the evidence relevant to the 
likelihood of [his] torture.”  (Id. at 9.)  None of these 
arguments has merit.   
 
A.  Involvement of Jamaican Government 
 Article 3 of CAT provides that “[n]o State Party shall  
. . . expel, return („refouler‟) or extradite a person to another 
State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he 
would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”  Art. 3(1), 
S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.  Relying on the 
administrative regulations implementing CAT, 8 C.F.R. § 
1208.18(a)(1), we have stated:   
 
For an act to constitute torture under the [CAT] 
. . . , it must be: (1) an act causing severe 
physical or mental pain or suffering; (2) 
intentionally inflicted; (3) for an illicit or 
proscribed purpose; (4) by or at the instigation 
of or with the consent or acquiescence of a 
public official who has custody or physical 
control of the victim; and (5) not arising from 
lawful sanctions. 
 
Pieschacon-Villegas v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 671 F.3d 303, 
310 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).  Both the IJ and the 
BIA found that Green had failed to satisfy the fourth of these 
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factors: the requirement of government involvement or 
acquiescence in torture.  In his petition, Green argues that 
these findings amount to “judicial error and abused 
discretion.”  (Pet‟r‟s Br. 13.)     
 
 This argument is aimed directly at the IJ‟s factual 
determination, which was adopted by the BIA, that the 
Jamaican government would not consent to or acquiesce in 
potential retributive violence carried out by the Shower Posse.  
As mentioned above, however, our jurisdiction over final 
orders of removal is limited to “constitutional claims or 
questions of law.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).  Recognizing 
this statutory limitation, we have repeatedly stated that “[w]e 
do not have jurisdiction to ascertain whether [a] factual 
finding was supported by substantial evidence.”  Santos-
Reyes v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 660 F.3d 196, 200 (3d Cir. 
2011); see also Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 634 
(3d Cir. 2006) (“[F]actual or discretionary determinations 
continue to fall outside the jurisdiction of the court of appeals 
entertaining a petition for review.”); Alaka v. Att’y Gen. of the 
U.S., 456 F.3d 88, 103 (3d Cir. 2006) (“We do not have 
jurisdiction to review the merits of the IJ‟s factual 
conclusion[.]”).  Thus, we lack jurisdiction to consider 
Green‟s argument that the IJ erred in determining that the 
Jamaican government would not consent to or acquiesce in 
the Shower Posse‟s actions.2   
                                                 
2
 We note, however, that even if we did have jurisdiction to 
consider this argument, the IJ‟s finding appears to be 
supported by substantial evidence.  Although the IJ 
recognized that the Shower Posse “does exert strong 
influence in parts of Jamaica, particularly in the poorer areas 
of Kingston, and that there is corruption within the 
government of Jamaica,” (A.R. at 40), she noted several facts 
which indicated that the Jamaican government would not 
acquiesce in torture carried out by the gang: (1) Jamaican law 
provides penalties for corruption; (2) Jamaican authorities 
pursued and arrested several Shower Posse members who 
participated in the killings witnessed by Green, and at least 
one suspect was tried and convicted of murder;  and (3) 
Christopher “Dudus” Coke, the longtime leader of the Shower 
Posse, was apprehended by Jamaican authorities in 2010 and 
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B.  Kaplun Test 
 Green next argues that the IJ and BIA failed to apply 
the two-prong test undertaken by our Court in Kaplun.  In 
Kaplun, we stated that whether future torture was likely 
turned on two questions: “(1) what is likely to happen to the 
petitioner if removed; and (2) does what is likely to happen 
amount to the legal definition of torture?”  602 F.3d at 271.  
In reviewing Green‟s CAT application, the IJ assumed 
arguendo that the Shower Posse would try to harm Green, 
and then based her decision on the fact that this potential 
harm would not meet the legal definition of torture due to the 
lack of government involvement or acquiescence.  The BIA 
followed the same approach, assuming a likelihood of harm 
under the first Kaplun prong and then determining that this 
harm would not meet the legal definition of torture under the 
second Kaplun prong.  Green complains that it was error to 
assume harm under the first prong of the test and that the IJ 
and BIA instead were required to make an actual factual 
finding on that point.   
 
 This is a legal argument which we have jurisdiction to 
consider.  The argument, however, is unconvincing for 
several reasons.  First, Green failed to raise this Kaplun 
argument before the BIA, and a strong case can be made that 
he has not exhausted his administrative remedies and thus 
cannot raise the argument here for the first time.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(d)(1); Lin v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 543 F.3d 114, 120-
21 (3d Cir. 2008).  Even if he can raise this argument, 
however, Kaplun does not “specifically require[]” the IJ to 
make an actual finding as to each prong of the test.  (Pet‟r‟s 
Br. 11.)  Rather, Kaplun states only that “there are two 
distinct parts” to the analysis and that “[t]he two parts should 
be examined separately.”  602 F.3d at 271.  Green bears the 
burden of showing both that he would likely suffer harm if 
returned to Jamaica and that the harm would amount to the 
legal definition of torture.  Because the IJ and the BIA 
determined that Green had failed to satisfy the second prong 
of the Kaplun test, there was no need to make a factual 
                                                                                                             
extradited to the United States to stand trial on drug 
trafficking and racketeering charges. 
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finding as to the first prong.  See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 
U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are 
not required to make findings on issues the decision of which 
is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).  Accordingly, 
Green‟s argument that the IJ and BIA misapplied Kaplun is 
without merit.    
 
C.  Consideration of All Evidence in Record 
 Finally, Green argues that the IJ and BIA committed 
legal error by ignoring relevant evidence in the record tending 
to support his position that the Jamaican government turns a 
blind eye to the criminal acts of the Shower Posse.  Green is 
correct that “all evidence relevant to the possibility of future 
torture” must be considered in reviewing a CAT application.  
8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3).  However, his argument on this 
point fails because he never identifies any evidence that was 
overlooked.  Instead, he revisits his argument that the IJ and 
BIA “misinterpreted the country condition research,” “erred 
in finding that the evidence „falls short‟” of satisfying CAT 
requirements, and “rule[d] contrary to the substantial country 
condition research.”  (Pet‟r‟s Br. 18, 19, 22.)  It is therefore 
apparent that Green‟s real argument is not that relevant 
evidence was ignored, but rather that the IJ incorrectly 
weighed evidence in making factual determinations.  As 
stated above, however, we lack jurisdiction to consider such 
an argument.   
 
Moreover, we are persuaded that the IJ did consider all 
relevant record evidence in rendering her decision.  In support 
of his application, Green testified at length and submitted 
documentary evidence in the form of country reports and 
newspaper articles describing the gang culture in Jamaica and 
corruption within the country‟s government.   Green himself 
admits that the IJ “accepted” his testimony and “gave 
credence to the U.S. Department of State report which relates 
that the Shower Posse „exerts a strong influence within 
certain areas of Jamaica.‟”  (Id. at 11.)  Moreover, although 
the IJ‟s opinion did not specifically discuss every individual 
piece of evidence, the IJ made clear that she had 
“[c]onsider[ed] all of the evidence of record.”  (A.R. at 40.)  
This is all that is required, as we have previously stated that 
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the IJ and BIA need not “discuss every piece of evidence 
mentioned by an asylum applicant.”  Huang v. Att’y Gen. of 
the U.S., 620 F.3d 372, 388 (3d Cir. 2010).  The IJ cannot be 
said to have ignored relevant record evidence, and Green‟s 
argument on this point is unpersuasive.    
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 In sum, we discern no reason to disturb the decision of 
the BIA.  Accordingly, Green‟s petition will be denied.   
 
